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When monetary policies are endogenous, the conventional VAR approach for detecting the
e⁄ect of monetary policies is powerless. This paper proposes to test the implication of monetary
policies along a di⁄erent dimension. That implication is to exploit the policy induced exogeneity
of endogenous variables that are the source of monetary non-neutrality. We illustrate the idea
by constructing a new Keynesian sticky wage model with capital accumulation and then testing
the implications of optimal monetary policies for nominal wages under both complete and
incomplete information. Econometric test using post war US data suggests that the nominal
wage is exogenous with respect to lagged macro variables. Such exogeneity is consistent with
new Keynesian models in which the monetary authority pursues active monetary policy based
on information with a lag.
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11 Introduction
For decades, detecting the non-neutrality of money using VARs has been the major means
to ﬁnd out the real eﬀects of monetary policy. The power of VARs for detecting the eﬀects of
money, however, relies largely on the identifying assumption that monetary policy changes be
exogenous, so as to render meaningful the notion of “monetary policy shocks” in an impulse
responses analysis. Unfortunately, it is hard to deny that the so called “monetary policy shocks”
are often endogenous. The endogeneity of monetary policy implies that VAR’s can fail to identify
the mechanisms through which monetary policy aﬀects the real economy as well as the true
magnitude of that eﬀect, because money can fail to appear as a signiﬁcant dependent variable in
a VAR when it is endogenous.1
To illustrate, denote st as the vector of the state variables that all agents in the economy
observe in period t,d e n o t ect as the vector of decision variables of the private sector, and assume
that monetary policy follows the linear feedback rule mt = αst.2 Suppose a rational-expectations











⎦ + B1Etmt+1 + B2mt,
in which the monetary policy, m, is taken as parametric by the private sector of the economy.
A c c o r d i n gt oc l a s s i c a lt h e o r y ,B1 = B2 =0 , hence money does not inﬂuence the real economy.
According to Keynesian theory, B1,B 2 6= 0 and money does have real consequences.
The fact that the matrices B 6= 0, however, does not at all imply that the eﬀects of money can
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1In a comprehensive econometric analysis, Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) showed that most VAR speciﬁcations
imply that only a modest (or in some cases, essentially none) of the variance of output or prices in the US since
1960 is attributable to shifts in monetary policy, and on the other hand, that a large fraction of the variation in
monetary policy instruments is attributable to systematic reaction by policy authors to the state of the economy.
They conclude that “This is of course what we would expect of good monetary policy, but it is also the reason
why using the historical behavior of aggregate time series to uncover the eﬀects of monetary policy is diﬃcult.”
2If α is time-dependent and is itself a function of the state, we can linearize the monetary feedback rule,
mt = α(st)st, around a steady state to get a similar formula.
2Solving for the system forward under tranversality conditions and rational expectations, the
equilibrium decision rules obtained by the private sector then take the form:
ct = c(α,st),
which reﬂects the Lucas Critique that the forward looking private sector’s decision rules are not
invariant to the monetary policy α. It follows that the state variables in the economy evolve
according to the equilibrium law of motion:
st+1 = s(α,st).
The control vector c c a na l s ob ee x p r e s s e di naV A Rf o r m :
ct+1 =˜ c(α,ct),
where the mapping ˜ c may be singular.
It is then clear that in a correctly speciﬁed VAR model for the economy, money fails to show
up as a signiﬁcant dependent variable when it is endogenous. That is, money fails to Granger
cause endogenous variables such as st+1 in a VAR even if it does have real inﬂuences on st+1.
In such a case, it is diﬃcult not only to measure the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy, but
also to distinguish the classical theory from the Keynesian theory by VARs. In the classical case,
money fails to show up in a VAR as a signiﬁcant dependent variable because B1 = B2 =0 . In the
Keynesian case, money also fails to show up as a signiﬁcant dependent variable in a VAR simply
due to the endogenouty of monetary policy. If the monetary authority should follow a passive
money growth rule according to monetarism, VARs will also be incapable of fully identifying the
real eﬀects of money.
This paper proposes to assess the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy by testing the implication of
endogenous monetary policy along a diﬀerent dimension. That implication is the policy-induced
exogeneity of some endogenous variables that are the source of monetary non-neutrality.
According to the new Keynesian theory, short-run price or nominal wage stickiness are the
culprit of monetary non-neutrality. If this is the case, then optimal monetary policies aiming at
stabilizing the economy will render some of the price variables completely “sticky”, so that they
become completely independent of any endogenous variables in the economy.3
3On the other hand, if prices adjust instantaneously as in the neoclassical theory, then they ought to be
determined by endogenous variables that inﬂuence supply and demand. Hence, they ought to be themselves
endogenous.
3To illustrate, suppose there are two nominal prices in an economy, p1 and p2, and that p1
is temporarily sticky in the sense that it is inﬂuenced by two forces at any point of time: one
pertaining to its own history, reﬂecting price inertia or stickiness, and the other pertaining to
market clearing forces, indicating that supply and demand will rule in the long run. These









θj = θ ∈ [0,1],k≤∞ ;( 1 )
where p∗
1 is the equilibrium market-clearing price that adjust instantaneously to demand and




1 =l o gp2 + f(x),
where x denotes equilibrium quantities in the economy.
In the neoclassical economy, the relative price, (logp∗
1 − logp2), is completely determined by
the market forces f(x) and is independent of the inﬂuence of money.4 In the new Keynesian
economy, the relative price, (logp1 − logp2), is not completely determined by market forces, and
money is not neutral in the short run:
logp1t − logp2 =
k X
j=1
θj logp1t−j +( 1− θ)logp
∗




θj logp1t−j +( 1− θ)f(x) − θlogp2.
The goal of an optimal monetary policy is then to choose money supply such that the relative
price in the Keynesian economy behaves in the same way as it does in a classical economy:
logp1 − logp2 = f(x).















4Since f(·) is homogeneous of degree zero in money, it can be viewed as independent of money.
4Then by equation 1, we have
logp
∗






Therefore, the endogenous variables, p∗
1, is rendered completely exogenous under optimal mon-
etary policy. This striking implication of optimal monetary policy on prices can be exploited to
assess the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy and the new Keynesian theory. The recent literature
of the “new synthesis” is full of examples of that implication. For example, King and Wolman
(1998) showed that the aggregate price is a constant under optimal monetary policy when the
source of monetary non-neutrality is the sticky price.5 We show, however, that the same impli-
cation holds in more general settings in which capital accumulation and incomplete information
of the monetary authority are taken into consideration explicitly.
In what follows, we concretize our ideas by embedding a new Keynesian sticky wage model
into a rational expectations, stochastic general equilibrium framework with capital accumulation
in section 2. We show the quantitative business cycle eﬀects of nominal wage stickiness in the
new Keynesian model in section 3. Optimal monetary policies are discussed in sections 4 and 5 in
the contexts of complete information and incomplete information. There we prove the complete
exogeneity of nominal wages under these monetary policies. In section 6, the implications of
optimal monetary policy for the dynamic behavior of nominal wages are exploited to assess the
eﬀectiveness of post-war US monetary policy. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We embed a textbook Keynesian model (Sargent, 1987, p50) into a rational expectations
general equilibrium framework by assuming that the labor market does not clear instantaneously
in the short run due to nominal wage stickiness, and that only the goods market and the asset
market clear instantaneously.6 As a result, the aggregate supply curve is upward sloping, and
the levels of employment and output are in part determined by aggregate demand and monetary
policies.
5For the case of sticky wages, see Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). Also see Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1997, 1998, 1999), Gali and Gertler (1999), Gali and Monacelli (2000), Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoﬀ (1999), and
among others for that implication of price behavior under optimal monetary policies.
6The model shares similar features to that of Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000). Also see Taylor (1980), Calvo
(1983), and the more recent work of Leeper and Sims (1994).
5Speciﬁcally, a representative household chooses sequences of consumption {ct}
∞







, capital stock {kt+1}
∞
t=0 , and labor supply {ns
t}
∞































+ kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt =
wt
pt




where the gross growth rate of money supply, xt = mt/mt−1, is also taken as exogenous by the
private sector.
Assuming that the goods market clears instantaneously, the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions




























(rt+1 +1− δ)( 5 )
ct + kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt =
wt
pt
nt + rtkt (6)
mt = mt−1xt (7)
where (3) relates optimal labor supply to the real wage, (4) gives the optimal demand for real
money balance, (5) characterizes the optimal consumption demand, (6) relates aggregate demand
for goods to aggregate real income (the goods market clearing condition), and (7) equates nominal















which reﬂects the quantity theory of money and where the right-hand side can be interpreted as
the inverse velocity of money.







6where At represents random shocks to productivity. In each period, the ﬁrm chooses the demand
for labor nd














































The optimal demand for labor is then given by:
n
d












Substituting this labor demand schedule into the production function gives the aggregate supply
function:












which is upward sloping with regard to the price level pt.


























































If the labor market clearing condition, ns = nd, holds, then equations (8) and (9) can be
combined to solve for the equilibrium real wage and employment, which together with equations
(11) and (12) determine the optimal paths of ct,k t+1, and nt in terms of the state (At,k t).
7Equation (10) then determines the price level. This is the classical result in which money is a
veil.7
Due to stickiness in the nominal wage wt, however, the household’s labor supply ns does not
always equal to the ﬁrm’s labor demand, nd. H e n c ew ec a n n o tu s et h el a b o rm a r k e tc l e a r i n g
condition to solve for employment. Instead, the level of employment (the eﬀective labor demand
nd) has to be determined by equilibrium in the goods market. That is, the system of equations for








































Notice that money matters in such an economy because it aﬀects the price level p,w h i c hi nt e r n s
aﬀects the aggregate demand and aggregate supply through its eﬀect on the real wage w/p.
In a standard Keynesian model, in place of the labor market clearing condition is an equation
that speciﬁes exogenously the short-run behavior of the nominal wage. We assume that the
nominal wage is inﬂuenced by two forces: one pertains to the history of nominal wages, reﬂecting
wage inertia or stickiness due to institutional factors or staggered wage setting behavior; and
the other pertains to market forces from demand and supply. We assume that in the long run
nominal wages are determined solely by demand and supply of labor. Under these assumptions,









j=1 θj = θ ∈ [0,1],k≤∞ , and where w∗ is the equilibrium nominal wage determined by














7In the classical model, the equilibrium nominal wage is a function of the state: wt = f(kt,A t). It is therefore
not exogenous with respect to current macro conditions. In the case that the technology shocks are serially
correlated, the nominal wage is also in part predictable by lagged variables such as lagged output.
8Equation system (13) - (16) represents the textbook version of the Keynesian model in a
dynamic, rational expectations setting. The Keynesian model has a simple form of analytical
solution when the rate of capital depreciation δ = 1. In such a case, the decision rule for kt+1 is
given by:

































According to equation 13, the net aggregate demand function is given by:
logct =l o g
1 − β
φ
+l o gmt − logpt.
Using a standard price-quantity diagram, the above supply curve is upward sloping and the
demand curve is downward sloping (see ﬁgure 1).
Figure 1. The “Keynesian” eﬀect of a decrease in nominal wage.
Due to the stickiness in the nominal wage, a decrease in the money supply shifts the demand
curve inward, causing a reduction in the equilibrium quantities of net output and consumption.
On the other hand, a decrease in the nominal wage raises the aggregate supply, which shifts the
supply curve upward, resulting in a drop in the equilibrium price level and an increase in the
equilibrium quantities. This “Keynesian eﬀect”of changes in the nominal wage on equilibrium
quantity and price is shown in ﬁgure 1. It is also clear from the diagram that the central bank
9should conduct an expansionary monetary policy to shift the demand curve upward when facing
an adverse supply shock (such as an oil price increase) which shifts the supply curve downward.
3 Business Cycles in the Keynesian Economy
To quantify the business cycles arising from the Keynesian economy, we calibrate the model’s
parameters, generate impulse responses of the model to monetary and technology shocks, and
compare them to the classical model in which θ = 0. Since analytical solutions for the Keynesian
model do not exist when δ<1, the model is solved using the method of log-linearization around
the long-run steady state where all markets are cleared. Because the model becomes a standard
RBC model when θ = 0, we will use the two terms, “classical” and “RBC”, interchangeably in
what follows.
Monetary growth and technology shocks are assumed to follow AR(1) processes:
logxt =( 1− ρx)+ρx logxt−1 + εxt,ε xt ∼ i.i.d(0,1),
logAt =( 1− ρa)+ρa logAt−1 + εat,ε at ∼ i.i.d(0,1),
The structural parameters are calibrated according to quarterly time frequency as follows. The
capital elasticity of output α =0 .3, t h et i m ed i s c o u n t i n gf a c t o rβ =0 .99, the inverse labor supply
elasticity γ =1 .5, the rate of capital depreciation δ =0 .025, and the distributed lag parameter,
k, in the wage equation (16) is set to one, so that
logwt = θlogwt−1 +( 1− θ)logw
∗
t.
The two autoregressive coeﬃcients, ρx and ρa,a r es e tt o0 .9. The impulse responses of output,
consumption, investment and labor demand to a negative one percent decrease in money supply
are plotted in ﬁgure 2, where dashed lines represents the classical model (θ = 0) and solid lines
represent the Keynesian model (θ =0 .9).
It is seen in ﬁgure 2 that a contractionary monetary shock has a hump-shaped eﬀect on the
sticky-wage economy, while leaving the RBC economy completely intact. At the impact of the
shock, output in the Keynesian economy drops by about 0.5 percent, and the other variables
drop by a similar amount. The full impact on the economy, however, does not arrive until 5
quarters later, exhibiting a very strong lagged multiplier eﬀect. At the trough of the recession,
output drops by 2.2 percent, consumption drops by one percent, investment drops by more than
7 percent, and employment drops by almost 3 percent.
10The recovery from the business cycle trough is very slow. It takes about 60 quarters for output
to reach its pre-shock level from the business cycle trough. Such persistent eﬀects of monetary
shocks on an sticky-wage economy is very typical and they will be discussed further below in
comparison with the case of technology shocks.
The impulse responses to a negative one percent decrease in technology are shown in ﬁgure 3,
where the dashed lines represent the RBC model and solid lines represent the Keynesian model.
Sticky nominal wages render the economy more volatile than the RBC economy in response to
technology shocks. For example, output in the sticky wage model drops by 2 percent at the impact
of the technology shock, as oppose to 1.3 percent in the ﬂexible wage model. Table 1 summarizes
some selected second moments of the two economies. It shows that the variance of output in
the sticky wage model is about (?) times that in the RBC model. Higher volatilities induced
by the nominal wage stickiness reduce welfare because they hinder consumption smoothing and
intertemporal substitutions.
The reason why output is more volatile in the presence of sticky nominal wages is obvious.
Due to a decrease in productivity, the marginal product of labor also decreases. Since nominal
wage is sticky, which results in stickiness in the marginal cost of labor, the marginal beneﬁto f
labor must be kept from decreasing in order to maximize proﬁt. This compels ﬁrms to cut labor
demand more than necessary in order to maintain the desired level of the marginal product of
labor. Hence output falls more than necessary. Consequently, both consumption and investment
also fall more than they do in the RBC model.
Another feature of the impulse responses to technology shocks in the sticky wage model is
the fast recovery relative to the classical model after a technology shock. It takes output only
4 quarters and employment only 2 quarters respectively to recover half of their pre-shock levels,
as oppose to 9 quarters and 6 quarters respectively in the ﬂexible wage model. Such a speed of
recovery is especially striking when being compared to the case under a monetary shock (ﬁgure
2), where the length of half-life recovery is at least 4-5 times longer starting from the business
cycle trough.
A. Inspecting the Propagation Mechanism
Why do recoveries take so much longer under monetary shocks than under technology shocks?
The answer lies in the diﬀerent propagation mechanisms of the sticky wage economy with regard to
the two diﬀerent sources of shocks. Under technology shocks, the main mechanism for propagating
11the impact of the shock is through capital accumulation. The speed of labor market adjustment
plays little role in magnifying that propagation. On the other hand, under monetary shocks, the
main propagation mechanism is the sluggish labor market adjustment.
To see the diﬀerences in the propagation mechanisms, consider a simpler version of the sticky
wage model where the rate of capital depreciation δ = 1 and where the inverse elasticity of labor




ˆ At + ˆ kt +
1 − α
α
(ˆ pt − ˆ wt).








ˆ At +ˆ yt−1 +
1 − α
α
(ˆ mt − ˆ ct − ˆ wt).
Substituting out consumption by the decision rule: ct =( 1− βα)yt, the above equation (after
re-arrangement) can be further reduced to:
ˆ yt = αˆ yt−1 + ˆ At +( 1− α)ˆ mt − (1 − α)ˆ wt.
T h en o m i n a lw a g ec a nb ee x p r e s s e da sd i s t r i b u t e dl a g si nm o n e ys u p p l y :
ˆ wt = θ ˆ wt−1 +( 1− θ)ˆ w
∗
t
= θ ˆ wt−1 +( 1− θ)(γˆ nt +ˆ pt +ˆ ct)





where L is the lag operator. Hence the nominal wage is constant without monetary shocks.
Namely, ˆ wt =ˆ mt =0 . This implies that the law of motion for the output in the absence of
monetary shocks follows:
yt = αyt−1 + At.
It is clear then that the impact of technology shocks is propagated in output over time purely
through the technology parameter α, which also governs the speed of capital accumulation in the
model.
On the other hand, under monetary shocks, the law of motion for output follows:




12which implies a second order diﬀerence equation,
ˆ yt =( θ + α)ˆ yt−1 − θαˆ yt−2 +( 1− α)θˆ xt,
where ˆ xt =ˆ mt − ˆ mt−1 is the money growth rate. The two roots of the second order diﬀerence
equation are θ and α, which governs the speed of convergence to the steady state after a shock.
Clearly, the propagation mechanism of monetary shocks is determined by the speed of labor
market adjustment (θ) being compounded by the speed of capital accumulation (α).
This implies that while the impact of technology shocks is immediately absorbed by the
economy, it takes a much longer time for the economy to fully absorb the total impact of a
monetary shock, and it also takes a much longer time for the economy to recover from that shock.
That is, recessions caused by monetary shocks are much harder to overcome than those caused
by technology shocks. The contrast is shown in ﬁgure 4, where the solid lines represent impulse
responses to a monetary shock and the dashed lines represent impulse responses to a technology
shock.8
F i g u r e4a l s or e v e a l st h a tu n d e rnominal wage stickiness the eﬀect of monetary shocks on
employment and consumption is much stronger comparing to that of technology shocks. For
example, employment drops by nearly 3 percent at the business cycle trough under monetary
shocks as oppose to 1.5 percent under technology shocks. This is so because for a similar drop in
output, employment drops more when the total factor productivity remains constant than it does
when the total factor productivity decreases (due to a negative technology shock). Consequently,
the productivity of labor or the real wage will rise under adverse monetary shocks whereas they
will decrease under adverse technology shocks. This is shown in ﬁgure 5. Economic history seems
to conﬁrm these predictions. For example, during the Great Depression, which is thought being
caused by a severe monetary contraction, the average manufacturing real wage for all industries
rose by more than 10% during the contraction phase of the business cycle (see Bordo, Erceg, and
Evans, 2000). Whereas during the oil price crises in the early 70s, the average hourly real wage
for total private sector dropped by about 4% at the business cycle trough.
The fact that money is not neutral in the Keynesian economy oﬀers not only the room but
also the desirability of an active monetary policy. The following two sections discuss the design
8Using a similar model to ours, Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000) study the impact of contractionary mone-
tary policy during the Great Depression. Quantitative calibration exercises in their work showed that monetary
contraction is responsible for the slow recovery of the US economy during that period.
13and the implementation of optimal monetary policies that eliminate the ineﬃciency caused by
sticky nominal wages, as well as the econometric implications for testing the eﬀectiveness of these
policies.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy under Complete Information
A ﬁrst-best outcome is deﬁned as the resource allocation in the RBC model (θ =0 )i nw h i c h
the labor market clears instantaneously. As is seen earlier, output is less volatile in the RBC
model in response to exogenous shocks. In comparison, a larger volatility of output arises in the
Keynesian model due to the fact that the real wage fails to equate labor supply and labor demand
because of nominal wage rigidity. Precisely due to that rigidity, however, monetary policy has
real inﬂuence on the real wage.




t =¯ w(wt−1,w t−2,,...,wt−k),
where






Proof. To replicate the neoclassical allocation, an optimal monetary policy should seek to
replicate the real wage that clears the labor market. Since the real wage in the sticky wage model









































Remark 1 By equation (16), the above also implies:














Substituting the real wage into the labor demand function (9) immediately yields the same condi-
tion that would obtain in the classical model where the labor market clears instantaneously.
Proposition 2 To implement the optimal monetary policy, the monetary authority should set









Proof. Combining equations 13 and 17 gives:


















Remark 2 Proposition 2 suggests that it is always possib l et oi m p l e m e n to p t i m a lm o n e t a r yp o l i c y
according to (18) such that the market clearing wage, w∗

















and the nominal wage is ensured to follow9
wt = w
∗
t =¯ w(wt−1,w t−2,,...,wt−k). (4.3)
9Notice that the policy works regardless of the value of θ (i.e., even in the case θ = 1 where nominal wage is
perfectly sticky). This is so because for any type of nominal wage rigidity, we need only to choose money supply
according to (18) so that the real wage is ensured to follow (17).
15Corollary 3 When the labor supply is inﬁnitely elastic, the optimal monetary policy is to follow
a passive rule by setting money growth rate to the wage inﬂation rate.
Proof. When the labor supply is inﬁnitely elastic, we have γ =0 . Equation (18) implies that
money supply follows a passive rule.¥
One of the most striking implications of optimal monetary policies in the new Keynesian model
is the policy-induced complete exogeneity of nominal wage behavior given by equation (19). That
implication can be exploited to test the eﬀectiveness of the US monetary policy.
A. Decision Making under Endogenous Monetary Policy
To obtain a deeper understanding on the inﬂuence of monetary policy when agents are forward
looking, it is instructive to see how the private sector actually derive optimal decision rules under
rational expectations in the presence of endogenous monetary policy.
Log linearize the ﬁrst order conditions (13)-(15) around the long-run steady state under the


























⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦

















⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
+ Z2 ˆ mt,
where a hat variable ˆ xt denotes percentage deviations from its steady state value ¯ x:ˆ xt ≡ logxt−
log ¯ x. The state variables include the initial capital stock, the level of technology, the history
of nominal wages, and the monetary policy: {kt,A t,w t−1,...wt−k,m t}. The control variable is
consumption ct. Solving for the above system forward under transversality conditions, the linear
16decision rule of consumption takes the form:
ˆ ct = πckˆ kt + πca ˆ At +
k X
j=1





If the monetary policy is endogenous, say it is given by
ˆ mt = αˆ st,
where st is a vector of endogenous variables that the monetary authority employs for feedback,
then the private sector’s decision rule takes the form:
ˆ ct = π
0
ck(α)ˆ kt + π
0






Notice that the decision rules depend now on the policy rule α. If the monetary policy is optimal







where Y denotes the vector of all endogenous variables in the model excluding the set of nominal
variables {wt,p t},a n dw h e r eY RBC denotes RBC allocations (θ =0 ) .
Figure 6 shows the impulse responses of output, consumption, investment and employment
to a technology shock under the intervention of the monetary authority. It is seen there that
the allocations are exactly the same as those of RBC. The response of the optimal monetary
policy to the technology shock is clearly counter-cyclical, as it is inversely related to the level of
employment (equation 18). This is shown in ﬁgure 6 1. It suggests that during the early 70s oil
price crisis, an expansionary monetary policy (rather than an contractionary monetary policy)
would have been optimal in mitigating the impact of the shocks.
5 Optimal Monetary Policy under Incomplete Information
In the previous section, we showed that the optimal policy to achieve the RBC allocation
in the presence of wage inertia is to set the market clearing nominal wage w∗ completely sticky
(exogenous). In this section, we show that a similar result holds even when the monetary authority
does not have complete information regarding the economy in designing monetary policy.
Suppose that the central bank cannot not access time t information available to the private
sector, including the technology shock, at the beginning of time t. The central bank instead can
17only observe the state of the economy with one period lag. What is the optimal monetary policy
in that circumstance? To facilitate discussions, we use log-linearized version of the model in the
following discussions.
Proposition 4 With incomplete information, an optimal monetary policy should target the ex-
pected nominal wage such that





θj ˆ wt−j. (5.1)




is achieved when the real wage in the new Keynesian economy is equal to that in the neoclassical
economy. Due to information lag, however, the government can achieve only the second-best






The ﬁrst order conditions (14) and (15) suggest that the second-best outcome can be achieved
by equalizing the expected real wages:
Et−1 (ˆ wt − ˆ pt)=Et−1 (ˆ w
∗
t − ˆ pt).
Cancelling Et−1ˆ pt on both sides yields Et−1 ˆ wt = Et−1 ˆ w∗
t. Substituting this into the wage equation
(16) yields the desired result.¥
Proposition 5 The optimal money supply rule under incomplete information is given by
ˆ mt = Et−1 ˆ mt =
k X
j=1
θj ˆ wt−j − γEt−1ˆ nt.
Proof. Since the expected market-clearing nominal wage follows
Et−1 ˆ w
∗
t = Et−1 (γˆ nt +ˆ pt +ˆ ct),
and since
Et−1 (ˆ pt +ˆ ct)=Et−1 ˆ mt,
combining the two equations gives:
Et−1 ˆ mt = Et−1 ˆ w
∗




θj ˆ wt−j − γEt−1ˆ nt.
¥
18Corollary 6 Under the optimal monetary policy that achieves (20), the nominal wage is com-
pletely exogenous in the sense that no lagged variables except its own history has predictive power
on the nominal wage w∗
t.






θj ˆ wt−j + et,
where the error term, et ≡ ˆ w∗
t − Et−1 ˆ w∗
t, satisﬁes Et−1et =0 , implying that it is orthogonal to
time t − 1 information set.¥
It is instructive to demonstrate how et is related to time t innovations in technology, as the
demonstration also illustrates how agents solve for the decision rules under endogenous monetary
policy with incomplete information.


























⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
+ R1Et ˆ mt+1 + R2 ˆ mt. (5.2)
Taking expectation on both sides of the equation against t − 1 information set, and substituting
out the monetary policy by ˆ mt = αEt−1ˆ st gives:
Et−1
⎡









⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
=( I − R1α)
−1 (M + R2α)Et−1
⎡









⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
,
where the monetary policy rule α remains to be determined, and st ≡
h
kt ct At wt−1 ··· wt−k
i0
.10
Solving for the system forward under transversality conditions gives a decision rule for expected
10It can be shown easily that any endogenous monetary rule can be reduced to a form depending on the vector
s.
19consumption:
Et−1ˆ ct = πcsEt−1s1t, (5.3)
where the new state vector s1t ≡
h
kt At wt−1 ··· wt−k
i0
. Given the speciﬁed AR(1) tech-
nology shock process, the expected state vector s1t can be written as
s2t = Et−1s1t =
h
kt ρaAt−1 wt−1 ··· wt−k
i0
,
which is known in time period t − 1. Hence, the optimal monetary policy under incomplete
information is given by (after substituting out the expected consumption):
ˆ mt = α
0ˆ s2t, (5.4)
which is the same as Et−1 ˆ mt since s2t is known in time period t − 1.
Substituting the monetary policy rule (23) into the original system (24), we can solve for the
decision rule of consumption:
ˆ ct = π
0
csSt,
w h e r et h es t a t ev e c t o rSt includes lagged technology At−1 :
St =
h
kt At At−1 wt−1 ··· wt−k
i0
.
As a result, all variables y in the economy are determined by St :
ˆ yt = πysSt,




t =ˆ wt = πwsSt.
Hence, the one-step ahead forecasting error, et, follows
ˆ wt − Et−1 ˆ wt






This shows how et depends on the innovations in technology shocks. Consequently, the nominal
wage w∗
t(wt−1,...,wt−k,e t) is completely exogenous in the sense that no lagged variables except
its own history has predictive power on its current behavior.
20The quantitative eﬀectiveness of optimal monetary policy under incomplete information are
shown in ﬁgure 7. It is seen there that due to the information lag, the central bank is not able
to mitigate the technology shock at the impact period, hence it is impossible to fully achieve
the RBC allocation. The central bank’s intervention, nevertheless, substantially improves the
economy’s performance in the subsequent periods. For example, the Okun’s gap in terms of
output is substantially reduced compared to the case of no intervention (see ﬁgure 8). The
variance of output is reduced by ? percent under the policy intervention.
6 An Econometric Assessment
The fact that the nominal wage is rendered completely exogenous under optimal monetary poli-
cies has the implication for testing the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy in a Keynesian economy.
In the case of complete information, the nominal wage is independent of both contemporaneous
and lagged endogenous variables. In the case of incomplete information, the nominal wage may
be correlated with contemporaneous variables because innovations in technology also aﬀect other
endogenous variables, but it is independent of the history of any endogenous variables. Hence we
develop two types of test for the eﬀectiveness of the post-war US monetary policy, both of which
are kin to the Granger causality test.
The ﬁrst type tests whether the nominal wage (wt) is correlated with any contemporaneous
endogenous variables, given its own history (wt−j,j =1 ,2,...). The lack of such correlation
indicates both monetary non-neutrality and the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy.
The second type tests whether the nominal wage is correlated with any lagged endogenous
variables given its own history. The lack of Granger causality from lagged endogenous variables
supports the view of monetary non-neutrality and the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy.11
A. Granger Test 1: Complete Information
We estimate the following equations for the US economy (1964:1-1995:2):
wt = f(wt−j),j =1 ,2,...k;( A )
11If the actual economy is a classical one, then the nominal wage is predictable by lagged endogenous variables
such as output, as long as technology shocks or any fundamental shocks are serially correlated. Even if these
shocks are not serially correlated, habit formation in labor supply (Wen, 1998) and dynamic labor adjustment
costs (Sargent, 1987, p199) all render the nominal wage dependent on lagged endogenous variables.
21wt = f (wt−j,X t),j =1 ,2,...k;( B )
wt = f (wt−j,x t),j =1 ,2,...k;( C )
wt = f (wt−j,p t),j =1 ,2,...k;( C )
where all variables are in growth rates, and where w denotes the nominal wage, x is a vector of
real variables that inﬂuence the labor supply and labor demand decisions, including the aggregate
consumption, the rate of capacity utilization (we use GDP as the proxy), the level of employment,
and the money stock, m. X is simply the nominal counterpart of x, and p is the price index (GDP
deﬂator). We choose the number of lags k =1 0i ne a c hr e g r e s s i o n .
We use two aggregate wage series in our test. One is the average hourly earnings for production
workers in the manufacturing sector, and another is the average hourly earnings for the total
private sector. The OLS estimation results are reported in table 1 and table 2, where values in
the third to ﬁf t hc o l u m ni n d i c a t et h es i g n i ﬁcance level of a corresponding set of variables under
the F test. Estimating (1) to (4) using manufacturing wage series gives the following results:
Table 1. Manufacturing Sector
Equation R2 F − Test(Xt) F − Test(xt) F − Test(pt) D − W stat.
(A) 0.68 1.99
(B) 0.77 0.08 2.21
(C) 0.77 0.22 1.93
(D) 0.74 0.000002 1.98
Table 1 shows that the manufacturing nominal wage is exogenous with respect to Xt and xt
(at the 5% signiﬁcance level), but not with respect to pt. The current price inﬂation rate has
av e r ys i g n i ﬁcant predicting power on the current wage inﬂation rate. However, with regard to
the wage series for the total private sector, all the contemporaneous variables, Xt, xt,a n dpt,
that inﬂuence labor supply and demand, do have signiﬁcant predictive power on the behavior of
nominal wage, as can be seen from table 2 below:
Table 2. Total Private Sector
Equation R2 F − Test(Xt) F − Test(xt) F − Test(pt) D − W stat.
(A) 0.73 2.00
(B) 0.81 0.003 2.47
(C) 0.77 0.0015 1.91
(D) 0.78 0.000009 1.89
22It is worth mentioning that money growth rate is always an insigniﬁcant variable in predicting
the behavior of the nominal wage, indicating the endogeneity of the money supply. According to
our theoretical models, if money were exogenous, the wage inﬂation rate is at least in part related
to money growth rate by the equation:
wt = f (γnt + mt).
Hence, money should have predictive power on the nominal wage unless it is endogenous.
The overall results indicate that if the central bank has complete information and has been
pursuing active monetary policy, then the monetary policy has not been very eﬀective in ﬁne-
tuning the economy.
B. Granger Test 2: Incomplete Information
The results in the above section could imply, however, that the central bank is not able to
act immediately to respond to economic shocks due to incomplete information (information lag).
This subsection tests the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy under that circumstance. According
to our earlier analyses, with incomplete information, an active monetary policy will result in
nominal wages that are not predictable by lagged endogenous variables. Both table 3 and table
4i n d i c a t et h a tt h i si sb r o a d l yt r u ef o rt h eU Se c o nomy. Namely, the nominal wages are broadly
exogenous with respect to lagged variables. The only exception is that the lagged price inﬂation
rate appears to be signiﬁcant at the 5% level in predicting the manufacturing nominal wage. The
inﬂation rate has no predictive power on the total private sector’s nominal wage. No variables in
Xt−1 or xt−1 have predictive power on either wage series.
Table 3. Manufacturing Sector
Equation R2 F − Test(Xt−1) F − Test(xt−1) F − Test(pt−1) D − W stat.
(A) 0.68 1.99
(B) 0.78 0.62 2.09
(C) 0.68 0.88 1.98
(D) 0.69 0.04 1.98
23Table 4. Total Private Sector
Equation R2 F − Test(Xt−1) F − Test(xt−1) F − Test(pt−1) D − W stat.
(A) 0.73 2.00
(B) 0.78 0.96 2.01
(C) 0.75 0.28 1.99
(D) 0.73 0.35 1.99
The empirical evidence seems consistent with rational expectations models in which monetary
authorities pursue optimal policies under lagged information. The fact that only the aggregate
price level has predictive power on one of the nominal wage series could imply that some nominal
wages are set or indexed in practice in accordance with price inﬂation rate rather than the
ineﬀectiveness of monetary policies. In order to be able to diﬀerentiate this possibility from the
implication of ineﬀective monetary policies, however, further investigations are needed.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper showed that under active monetary policies, endogenous variables that are the cul-
prits of monetary non-neutrality are rendered completely exogenous. We tested that implication
using post war US data. Although our ﬁndings are still very preliminary and not conclusive, they
seem to suggest that the nominal wage is exogenous with respect to those lagged macro variables
that are expected to have signiﬁcant inﬂuences on the nominal wage dynamics. This is consistent
with the implication of a new Keynesian model in which money is not neutral due to nominal
wage stickiness and in which monetary policies are optimal and eﬀective.
While we ﬁnd this simple exercise to have been worthwhile, we believe that further work is
needed to validate and to reﬁne our empirical ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally, testing the exogeneity of
aggregate prices is another line worth pursuing, if it is not the nominal wage, but the sticky
nominal price that is the source of monetary non-neutrality. In addition, if there are more than
one sources of monetary non-neutrality, then a single monetary instrument is unlikely to correct all
of the distortions. In that case, depending on the monetary target, failing the Granger causality
test does not necessarily imply a rejection of the hypothesis that monetary policy is eﬀective.
24References
1. Bordo, M., C. Erceg, and C. Evans, 1997, Money, sticky wages, and the Great Depression,
NBER Working Paper No. W6071.
2. Calvo, G., 1983, Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework, Journal of Monetary
Economics 12, 383-398.
3. Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler, 1997, Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability:
Evidence and some theory, Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
4. Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler, 1998, Monetary policy rules in practice: some interna-
tional evidence, European Economic Review 42, 1033-1067.
5. Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler, 1999, The science of monetary policy: A new Keynesian
perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, forthcoming.
6. Erceg C., D. Henderson, and A. Levin, 2000, Optimal monetary policy with staggered wage
and price contracts, Journal of Monetary Economics 46, 281-313.
7. Gali, J. and M. Gertler, 1999, Inﬂation dynamics: Astructural econometric analysis, Journal
of Monetary Economics 44, 195-222.
8. Gali, J. and T. Monacelli, 2000, Optimal monetary policy and exchange rate volatility in a
s m a l lo p e ne c o n o m y ,U n i v e r s i t yo fP o m p e uF a b r a .
9. King, R. and A. Wolman, 1998, What should the monetary authority do when prices are
sticky? NBER Volume on Monetary Policy Rules, edited by J. Taylor.
10. Leeper, E. and C. Sims, 1994, Toward a modern macroeconomic model usable for policy
analysis, NBER Working Paper Series no. 4761.
11. Leeper, E., C. Sims and T. Zha, 1996, What Does Monetary Policy Do? Presented at the
Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, September 8, 1996
12. Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoﬀ, 1999, New directions for stochastic open economy models, NBER
Working Paper W7313.
13. Sargent, T., 1987, Macroeconomic Theory, Second Edition, Academic Press, London.
14. Taylor, J., Aggregate dynamics and staggered contracts, Journal of Political Economy 88,
1-24.
25Figure 2. Impulse Responses to a Negative Money Supply Shock
26Figure 3. Impulse Responses to a Negative Technology Shock














   
      29 Figure 6. The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy under Full Information.
30Figure 7. The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy under Incomplete
Information.
31Figure 8. Okun's Gap with and without Policy Intervention.
32